Proem
Prior to the journey described in the Prooemium, Parmenides must have been chosen out of all mortals, and the reason for the choice seems to be indicated by the words eiSdia (pcoxa, "knowing man". It is already a knowing man whom the sunmaidens guide toward a realm beyond the reign of opposites, of night and light. But he has not yet received the truth. So how does he already know? The goddess' greeting, Koope, would indicate that he cannot as yet have developed any appreciable wisdom on his own. Still, he is the initiate worthy to receive her revelation. Pride and modesty intertwine. This is hardly serious hybris. It might simply indicate that the goddess has made a good and worthy choice. If that implies that Parmenides is a good and worthy young man, this may redound more to the goddess' good sense than to his own glory.
1 But when we turn to the topography of the journey itself, real hybris comes into view. For the journey leads him through the gates which mark the boundary between the realm of mortals and the realm of the divine. These are the gates of the ways of Night and Day, of the basic cosmogonic opposites of the Way of Seeming that define and rule the world of mortal creatures. When Parmenides passes through these gates, he leaves behind not merely the world of the senses, but the whole realm of created being, of plurality and change, of space and time. He passes into a new dimension where none of these hold sway, a realm where the divine dwells. Unlike Homeric man to whom his gods will only speak down here on earth, Parmenides penetrates into their own realm. He is no heaven-storming Titan, to be sure. He comes by invitation and under divine guidance. But he comes, the first mortal to pass a barrier that Greek thought had until then held to be impassable. Man in the same realm as the divine, on the same level: this is serious hybris, even if he is there as a Koopoc; who will receive the word of truth.
2
The Proem emphasizes the seriousness and difficulty of passing through these gates in several ways. First, the path to them cannot be found by mortals but requires divine guidance, for " Far indeed does it lie from the beaten track of men". Second, the journey is made at very high speed with "the axle blazing in the socket'', an indication that it spans an 1 For discussion of the meaning and implications of ei8dia (parra, "knowing man", see enormous distance. Third, it is Dike herself, the dread goddess of justice, who controls entry, ready to exact swift vengeance on anyone trying to enter without permission. Fourth, the gates are described in careful detail so as to convey a vivid impression of their impregnable power: they are enormous, high in the air, sturdily built and well fortified with a lintel and threshold of stone, brazen posts fitted with rivets and nails. The doors which close them are mighty, and even the sunmaidens can gain entry only by entreaty. The momentous, more-than-human character of Parmenides' journey and the crucial nature of his passage through these gates are vividly impressed upon the reader. The mythological motif of the gates which are the boundary between the realm of mortals and that of the divine is here transformed and adapted by the philosopher to a radically new use, to mark the distinction between the doxa-world of mortals and the domain of being which is the home of the divine.
3 But even in this radically new use, the motif of the gates would make entry into the domain of the divine recognizable as hybris to traditional Greek piety.
4

Way of Truth
Nor is the distinction between the divine and the mortal re-established in the Way of Truth. Though Parmenides does not say a word but silently receives the revelation, there is no indication that once he has received it, his knowledge is in any way inferior to that of the goddess. She gives him the "unshaken heart of well-rounded truth", the understanding of being for which it is indifferent where she starts since she must come round again to the beginning. This seems to say that she is holding nothing back, that she is teaching him all there is to know. Fr. 1.29: ' A^.r|0eiTj<; euicuK^oq dtpeuec; ifcop, "the unshaken heart of wellrounded truth" seems to suggest that what she teaches him is neither ever to be upset by any challenges, additions or deletions, nor in need of rounding out, but complete and final as it stands.
5 This notion of truth, rounded and complete, is emphasized by Fr. 5 which literally anticipates the content of the Way of Truth as going in a circle: £uvdv 5e uoi ECTTIV d7t7ro' 9ev dp^rourzr TOOI yap jtdX.iv i'^ouai m30ic;, "It is all one to me from where I start, for I shall come back again there". onnoQev, "from where", is linked with TO0I, "there", by both ndXiv, "back", and ai50i<;, "again". But if every point in this circle is so closely linked with every other that each is both starting-and end-point, then the chain of reasoning is such that nothing could ever be taken away or added, so that she will truly have told him 7idvxa, "all things", Fr. 1.28. But if so, divine and human knowledge are then on a par. Nor is any hint given that Parmenides ever falters in his effort to follow her reasoning. The human mind is capable of grasping divine truth in its entirety.
Should this worry us? One might grant all this and even concede that such equation of human knowledge with divine merits the epithet'' hybris", and yet ask: What of it? Is it not appropriate and necessary that philosophy commit such hybrisi For is it not an expression of the great discovery that knowledge and truth are universal and objective? What else did Heraclitus mean to express in his haunting saying: "The logos is common"?
8 If the logos is truly common, it must be common even to gods and men. Therefore Socrates is right that even the gods love piety because it is pious, exactly as men do.
7 Standards of rationality are common to both because segmented and relative standards of rationality would be irrational. And Aristotle clinches the case by showing that logos is common because being is common.
8 For Parmenides, all truth is of its nature universal because being is one and self-identical. There is only one knowledge for the divine and the human because knowledge is of being and being is one.
Far from something at which man should tremble, such hybris might be seen as of the very essence of philosophy and as man's liberation from any non-objective, non-universal factors, at least as regards his knowledge. Two of the alternatives, namely, the beliefs that objective knowledge is attainable for neither gods nor men or that it is attainable for gods but not for men, would reduce philosophy and with it much of human life to a welter of conflicting subjective knowledge claims without an arbiter or a criterion to adjudicate among them. The only remaining alternative, namely, that human and divine knowledge are both objective but that man knows little while the divine knows all, would require two things: (a) that there is more to know than what Parmenides is told by the goddess; (b) that either she is holding something back or that he is unable fully to comprehend her words.
For neither (a) nor (b) is there any evidence in Parmenides' poem. Rather, the divine without jealousy raises man to her own level through his drive for knowledge. Philosophy is man's discovery of reason as the divine-like aspect in himself that lifts him above the shifting tides of mortality. Salvation through knowledge remains a constant theme in Greek thought. Yet always, since knowing is saturated with being which is its object, such knowledge is not a personal possession but in its stark universality transcends everything subjective and personal. The motifs of the journey on which he is guided and of the revelation silently received become metaphors for a hybris hand in hand with such profound awareness of human limitations that it can surely not be objectionable. 9 Still, to let the issue rest here would be to disregard the warning of traditional Greek wisdom that hybris brings disaster to man. The equation of human and divine knowledge remains disquieting on several counts. First, what gives one pause is not that Parmenides should know so much, but that the goddess should know so little. "The unshaken heart of well-rounded truth" is decidedly finite in content and therefore suited to a finite mind. Now while we know that the mind of mortal man is finite, dare we draw the same conclusion about the divine mind? We must if what she teaches Parmenides is all there is to know.
Second, this raises the question whether the motif of the journey from the realm of mortals to that of the divine is not perhaps a terrible self-deception. Has man been raised to divine stature-or has the divine been lowered to human stature? Has philosophy in its own way committed the offence of mythological thinking: that man conceives the divine in his own image? Instead of conceiving the divine in the image of the human body and human emotions, does philosophy conceive the divine in the image of the finite human mind?
Third, and worst, is the whole philosophy of being pervaded by a similar self-deception? Is knowledge finite in content because being is finite-or is being conceived as finite so as to be knowable by finite minds?
At this point the hybris of Parmenides shows itself in its real nature. The three questions we have raised would seem to be unanswerable for a finite mind. The divine mind may be finite like ours and being may be finite-but they may also not be so. Since a finite mind can only grasp finite being, it could not know whether the infinite is or is not. Wisdom would lie in conceding that all it can know is that it does not know.
The "hybris of Parmenides" is not an overweening pride of Parmenides the man but the audacity of finite reason to declare: "the same can be thought as can be", meaning its own thinking. 10 The charge of hybris rests on this equation of being with what is thinkable by a finite mind. In Fr. 3.1 the goddess asserts this equation in the strongest possible terms: to ydp auio voeTv £cmv TE Kai efvai. The infinitives are ambiguous enough to make different translations defensible:'' For thinking and being is the same"; "for it is the same thing that can be thought and can be" (Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 2, 14); "for the same can be thought as can be" (after Kirk and Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers, 269); "for the same thing exists for thinking and for being" (ibid.). But the point at issue is unaffected by differences in translation. The two infinitives, voetv and elvai, "to think'' and " to be", are linked by TO auxd, "the same" as well as by TG KCU, "and" in a symmetrical, co-ordinating manner. In other words, thinking and being mutually define one another, they are co-extensive in the strong sense that there can neither be thinking which is not of being, nor being which is not thinkable. Thinking and being are circumscribed within the same limits, and since the thinking in question can be grasped by a finite mind, that of Parmenides, being must be equally finite. Fr. 8.34 repeats this identification of thinking and being, using again TOUTOV, "the same", and T8 Kai, "and" in a co-ordinating manner.
The mutual entailment of thinking and being can be substantiated both from within Parmenides' poem and from later parallels in Plato and Aristotle: Thinking entails being because not-being is unthinkable (Fr. 2.5-8; Fr. 6.1-2; Fr. 8.8-9). Being entails thinking because (a) it is accessible only to thinking, not to perception, custom, or experience (Fr. 7); 11 (b) it is finite and complete (42) (43) 49) ; (c) the account of being given in the Way of Truth is complete, so that being in its entirety is thought and spoken by the goddess and thought by the finite mind of Parmenides (see p. 454 above).
We can draw on later parallels from Plato and Aristotle to show that being and thinking could be circumscribed within the same limits. Plato's middle period ontology characterizes the sensible world and the world of forms as dpaxdv "visible" and VOT| TOV "thinkable", respectively. Since only the world of forms is true being, to be and to be thinkable are equated, Republic 509 d -511 e. And Aristotle at De Anima III, 425 b 26-27 and 430 a 2-5 uses Parmenides' very word, TO aoxd "the same" (t\ OUTTJ at 425 b 26-27), to express the identity of perceptible and thinkable forms in external things and in the knower's mind. Since form is being in the paradigmatic sense for Aristotle, being and knowledge are again circumscribed within the same limits, but Aristotle counts perception as knowledge, unlike Parmenides and Plato. These later parallels are less bold than Parmenides' own equation of thinking and being, however. For while being and thinkable mutually entail one another for Plato (and in the wider sense of knowable also for Aristotle), they do not claim that what is thinkable is necessarily thought, nor do they claim to have given a complete account of being. But given the completeness of Parmenides' account, being and actual thinking mutually entail one another for him.
However one interprets the story of the journey and of the revelation, this mutual entailment is hybris because finite reason tailors being to its own requirements and declares that what does not fit those requirements does not and cannot exist. The object of its thinking must be finite, unmoving, and one-and beyond being, so defined, nothing can be . Finite mind legislates existence and non-existence in its unwillingness to meet reality on any but its own terms. Thereby it oversteps the bounds of its own competence. This is hybris without a sense of its proper place, without leaving open at least the possibility that what it cannot comprehend may yet be.
12 It has had three disastrous consequences for Western philosophy.
/. Ontological Impoverishment
Being as the object of cognition for finite reason is conceived as itself finite and rationally comprehensible. It is deprived of the richness and deep mystery of Heraclitus' logos which, though common, is yet unfathomable for a finite mind.
13 It is deprived of any context in which it could have significance and creative power as the being of beings, as an arche in relation to the cosmos. The Way of Truth stands in no foundational relationship to the Way of Seeming, for the latter has no truth at all.
14 "The same can be thought as can be" is a very sad statement when the thinking is that of a finite mind. It equates philosophy with a finite body of rational knowledge which can never be expanded, not even by a divine mind. For even divine knowledge is limited by the limits of being.
Human Impoverishment
The discovery of reason as a way of gaining access to being would not by itself impoverish human life since it would not preclude the possibility of relating to being in other ways as well, e.g., emotionally, perceptually, instinctually. It is only the hybris of reason in equating being and thinking which denies this possibility and so deprives humans of all other avenues to truth. By its own hybris, reason isolates itself from all human context and so deprives itself of all significance and function in human life and of all chance to grow towards ever wider horizons. Philosophy, equated with a finite body of rational knowledge, cannot be applied to argue that the path of not-being is altogether unthinkable since one could neither think nor speak what is not. And Fr. 6.1-2 reasons that only what can be spoken and thought can be. This seems to deny the very possibility of existence to anything not thinkable by a finite mind, since all these passages imply a reference to Parmenides' thinking. 13 Heraclitus, Fr. 45, Fr. 78, Fr. 102, Fr. 32, in Kirk and Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers, anything. It has consequently no foundational role to play in life. Reason becomes mere reason.
Residue of a Surd
In cutting off all other avenues to truth and being, reason in its hybris turns into its very opposite, stark and unmanageable unreason. The concept of being, tailored to the requirements of finite reason, leaves as its residue a surd, not-being, which offers no marks, no holds to human understanding at all. The notion of absolute indeterminacy, of blank nothing, is so totally unmanageable that finite reason finds it necessary to assert, repeatedly and defensively, that it cannot exist, that it is unthinkable and unutterable. Yet, it is both thought and uttered in the Way of Truth. As the contradictory and only possible contrast to being, it is inescapable. For without a contrast, even being cannot be thought.
Conclusion
Philosophy as the love of wisdom, not equated with a finite body of rational knowledge, has resources for coping with that which transcends the grasp of finite reason. Greek philosophy from its very beginning with Anaximander stands under the notion of apeiron, the boundless, which marks the contrast between the limited, finite, comprehensible forces and beings in our universe and their divine origin which is beyond our comprehension. Anaximander's apeiron sets the basic perspective for much of Greek philosophy, the recognition that reality transcends the scope of finite reason. Heraclitus (cf. footnote 13 above), Xenophanes (Fr. 34, 35, 18) , Pythagoras in his recognition of both limit and unlimited (Aristotle, Metaphysics A5, 985 b 23 -6 a 21) explicitly philosophize within this perspective which culminates in Socrates' definition of human wisdom as knowing that we do not know (Apology). The charge of hybris against Parmenides can therefore be brought not only from the side of traditional Greek piety, the epic tradition, and Greek drama, but also from a central perspective of Greek philosophy itself. And the punishment intrinsic to the offence is perhaps best expressed in the dual meaning of doxa: for doxa is not merely opinion or seeming, it is also glory. The doxa-world which Parmenides leaves in order to rise up to the domain of the divine is not only man's home and proper place, it is also man's glory. And the personal tragedy of Parmenides is that he as a mortal cannot remain in the sphere of the divine, but he can also never truly come home again to his own proper place, to his human glory. For this place is no longer real to him.
15
But our tragedy as his heirs is that he has shifted the emphasis of philosophy from the pursuit to the possession of wisdom by removing the encompassing horizon of the apeiron. Within that horizon, human finitude can expand beyond its own limits in an awareness of its insufficiency before the richness, depth, and mystery of being. Knowing that we do not know gives our positive knowledge a wider context to which we can relate in other ways. Not being helpless before the apeiron, we can face it in wonder and awe, in openness and trust and listen for what signs it may give us. By shrinking being down to the measure of finite reason, Parmenides' hybris leaves us helpless and without trust in the face of what is rationally incomprehensible and so creates a spectre that has stayed to haunt us.
